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RECENT DEVELOPIVCIENTS
into evidence, and Ayers' conviction based on Section
470A(b)(3)(i) should have been
overturned. Id. at 660, 645
A.2d at 50-51.
By holding that Maryland's "Hate Crimes" statute is
not unconstitutional as applied
to the facts in Ayers v. State, the

Blaine v. Blaine:
INDEFINITE
ALIMONY MAY BE
AWARDED
PURSUANT TO
AN EXTENSION OF
REHABILITATIVE
ALIMONY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland
sent a warning to all Maryland
citizens that crimes motivated
by racial prejudice will not be
tolerated. In so holding, the
core of this opinion was that
racial prejudice, by itself, will
not be condoned, and when it is
coupled with the commission of

a crime, it will be separately
punished. The court spoke with
amoral conscience, and charged
all Maryland citizens to uphold
this moral code by respecting
the differences of all humankind.
- Andrea S. Holz

Indefinite alimony may
be granted upon the termination
of a fixed period of rehabilitative alimony, ifit is determined
that circumstances have arisen
since the divorce which would
render termination inequitable.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Blaine v.
Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d
413 (1994), broadened a trial
court's discretion in extending
indefinitely an original award of
rehabilitative alimony under sections 11-106 and 11-107 of the
Family Law Article of the Annotated Code ofMaryland. Additionally, the court concluded
that an award of indefinite alimony would be supported ifthe
divorced parties' respective
standards of living were found
to be unconscionably disparate,
and the formerly dependent
spouse had made as much
progress toward becoming self-

supporting as could reasonably
be expected.
InNovember 1985, Ms.
Blaine was granted an absolute
divorce in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, and was
awarded rehabilitative alimony
in the amount of $800.00 per
month for a period of sixty
months. The alimony award
was based on evidence that Dr.
Blaine, Ms. Blaine's husband,
earned a salary in excess of
$62,000.00 a year compared to
Ms. Blaine's income which totaled $10,000.00 a year. In
granting a fixed period ofalimony, the circuit court took into
consideration the fact that Ms.
Blaine was working towards a
master's degree in health promotion counseling, which she
anticipated would lead to a positionearning$40,OOO.00ayear.
Approximately five
years later, Ms. Blaine made a
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Motion to Extend and Increase
Alimony. In the period since the
original award of alimony, Ms.
Blaine had earned a master's
degree in health promotion, but
had failed to gain employment
in this field of training. A domestic relations master determined that her efforts to obtain
employment in the health promotion field had been reasonable, but had been unsuccessful
due to the static nature of the
economy. He found that this
was a change in circumstances
the time of the divorce as provided for under section 11107(a)(1) of the Family Law
Article.
The master also concluded that under section Ill 06(c)(2), Ms. Blaine had made
as much progress as could be
reasonably expected since she
was employed in three jobs unrelated to her training, earning
approximately $31,000.00 per
year. Due to the evidence that
Dr. Blaine's income had increased to $136,750.00 annually, the master found the parties'
respective standards of living
were unconscionably disparate
under section 11-1 06( c)(2).
Therefore, he recommended that
the alimony payments of
$800.00 per month be extended
indefinitely.
Dr. Blaine filed exceptions to the findings and recommendations made by the master.
The exceptions were denied by
the circuit court, which affirmed
the master's recommendations
and ordered the alimony payments of$800.00 per month be
extended indefinitely. Dr. Blaine

appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, which upheld the circuit court's ruling.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland subsequently granted Dr.
Blaine's petition for certiorari.
On appeal to the court
of appeals, Dr. Blaine argued
that the lower courts erred in
their application of section 11107 of the Family Law Article.
Blaine, 336 Md. at 61,646 A.2d
at 418-19. Section 11-107 provides for the extension of a period of alimony, or, in certain
situations, for the modification
of the amount. He further contended that the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel
barred the court from granting
an award of indefinite alimony
where it had earlier been determined that rehabilitative alimony was appropriate. Id at 62,
646 A.2d at 419.
Dr. Blaine maintained
that the primary purpose of the
statute was to provide financial
support for a fixed period of
time, allowing the dependent
spouse to acquire the skills and
training to become self-supporting. Having noted that Ms.
Blaine's financial condition had
improved since the original
award of alimony, he argued
that her inability to achieve her
particular career goal was not a
change in circumstances which
warranted the extension of alimony. Id Dr. Blaine also objected to the fact that his improved economic condition
since the divorce was considered evidence of the existence
of an unconscionable disparity
in the parties' respective stan-

dards ofliving. He claimed that
the statute did not intend that
the formerly dependent spouse
should be entitled to have his or
her standard of living conform
to that of the other spouse. Id
In addressing these issues, the court of appeals acknowledged that Maryland's
alimony statute, codified as sections 11-101 through 11-111 of
the Family Law Article, represents an important change in the
approach to alimony in Maryland. The court agreed with Dr.
Blaine that the underlying goal
of the legislation was '" not to
provide a lifetime pension but to
facilitate a transition for the parties from the joint married state
to the separate single one .... '"
Id. at64, 646A.2dat420(quoting the Report of the Governor's Commission on Domestic
Relation Laws (1980), at 4).
However, the court noted that
the interrelationship of sections
11-106 and 11-107 of the statute reserves discretion in the
trial court to ensure that the
appropriate degree of spousal
support is awarded after the dissolutionofamarriage.ld at 65,
646 A.2d at 421.
Section 11-106 governs
the determination of the duration and amount of an alimony
award. A trial court may grant
alimony under section 11106(c)(2) for an indefinite period if"even after the party seeking alimony will have made as
much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the
parties will be unconscionably

RECENT D/EVElOPflifENTS
disparate." Md. Code Ann.,
Fam. Law § 11-106(c)(2)
(1984).
The court of appeals
recognized that in the majority
of situations indefinite alimony
is awarded at the time of the
divorce.ld at 65, 646 A.2d at
420. It noted that the language
ofsection 11-1 06(c) is prospective, requiring a trial court to
predict whether the dependent
spouse will likely become selfsufficient in the future. The
court, however, rejected the
contention that an indefinite alimony award must always be
granted at the time of the divorce.ld Instead, it maintained
that the language of section Il106 could be applied retrospectively, when considering an extension of alimony under section 11-107, to detennine ifcircumstances since the divorce
had arisen which "would lead
to a harsh and inequitable result
without an extension." Id at
70,646 A.2d at 423.
Although the court
found the language of the statute plain and unambiguous, it
refused to accept an interpretation that would require a mechanical application of the perspective language ofsection Ill 06(c), serving to limit the judicial flexibility of awarding alimony. Consequently, the court
alternatively ascertained the legislative intent of the alimony
statute by analyzing the proposed bill submitted by the Governor's Commission on Domestic Relation Laws, upon which
the alimony statute was primarily based. It interpreted the

Commission's aim as one which
sought to vest substantial discretion in the courts to ensure
that the needs of the recipient
spouse were balanced against
the ability ofthe payor spouse to
provide financial support. Id at
66,646 A.2d at 421.
Consistent with this reasoning, the court of appeals
noted that in Tu"isi v. Sanzaro,
308 Md. 515, 520 A.2d 1080
(1987), it held that while the use
of rehabilitative alimony was
desirable, its use did not mandate the elimination of the
court's power to reserve future
judgment.ld at 68, 646 A.2d at
422. Quoting Tu"isi, the court
stated that, "'factsbeforeacourt
may demonstrate no present
basis for either rehabilitative or
indefinite alimony. But those
same facts may show that a highly probable basis for awarding
one or the other will exist in the
immediate future. '" Id (quoting Tu"isi, 308Md. at 527, 520
A.2d at 1086). Therefore, the
court detennined that reservation of future judgement was
consistent with the purposes of
the statute.
In applying this flexible
interpretation, the court concluded that the existence ofnew
circumstancesjustifying both an
extension ofalimony under section 11-107, and a possible basis for an award of indefinite
alimony under section 11-106,
call for the court to address
whether the granting of indefinite alimony would be necessary to avert a harsh and inequitable result. Id at 70, 646 A.2d
at 423. It reasoned that in deter-

mining ifan indefinite extension
is warranted, the trial court
should review section 11-1 06(b)
factors which were considered
at the time ofthe original award
to assist in adjudicating an appropriate alimony award. Id at
72, 646 A.2d at 424.
The court accordingly
rejected Dr. Blaine's argument
that his current salary should
not have been considered by the
lower court in its finding that
there existed an unconscionable
disparity between the two parties' standards of living. Id
The court ofappeals maintained
that section 11-107 did not limit
the relevant circumstances to
those pertaining solely to the
dependent spouse. Assessing
Ms. Blaine's increase in salary
without also considering Dr.
Blaine's current income, the
court found, would thwart the
equitable determinations which
are inherent to section 11-107.
Id at 73, 646 A.2d at 425.
Thus, the court determined that
the application of the circuit
court's findings in the original
alimony award, viewed in light
of the parties present income
equation, provided "a framework for the application of equitable principles, consistent
with the stated goals ofthe Commission Report and implicit in
the language of [section] 11106(c)(2) and [section] 11107(a)(I)." Id at 72,646 A.2d
at 424.
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Bell, with whom
Judge Chasanow joined, argued
that "[t]he achievement of equity and flexibility [would] not
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[be] furthered by permitting the
trial court, on the petition of a
formerly dependent spouse pursuant to [section] 11-107, to
revisit the duration of alimony
issue long after it [had] determined that the appropriate form
ofalimony [was] rehabilitative."
Id at 82,646 A.2d at 429. Bell
insisted that if it was factually
proven that rehabilitation could
not be accomplished in the time
predicted by the trial court judge,
section 11-107 permits the court
to correct what would "otherwise be a harsh and inequitable
result," by extending the period
of time in which rehabilitation
was to occur. Id He contended that section 11-107 was nev-
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er intended by !he Legislature to
be a mechanism by which the
formerly dependent spouse
would be provided "with a second opportunity to prove what
he or she was unable to prove
the first time--that he or she
[was] entitled to indefinite alimony." Id
By holding that a trial
court's awarding of rehabilitative alimony at the time of divorce does not necessarily preclude an award of indefinite alimony in the future, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Blaine
v. Blaine added additional judicial flexibility in the determination of the award of alimony.
Although the court acknowl-

edged that the statute's underlying principle requires that the
dependent spouse should become self-supporting, the
court's overriding aim was to
ensure that the appropriate degree of spousal support would
adapt to circumstances that
would otherwise result in inequitable standards of living between the parties. Hence, this
decision should invite increased
litigation, testing the degree of
the court's commitment in upholding the statute's clear legislative preference for granting
rehabilitative alimony over an
award of indefinite alimony.
- Karen Tossey-Ardis
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